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Articles
COLLEGE AND AMATEUR SPORTS GAMBLING:
GAMBLING AWAY OUR YOUTH?*
JOHN WARREN KINDT**

I.

&

THOMAS AsmR***

INTRODUCTION

In 1998, United States Senator Bill Bradley, a former NBA
great, exemplified the prevailing Congressional sentiment regarding sports betting:
I am not prepared to risk the values that sports instill in
youth just to add a few more dollars to state coffers ....
State-sanctioned sports betting conveys the message that
sports are more about money than personal achievement
and sportsmanship .... [S]ports betting threatens the
integrity of and public confidence in professional and amateur team sports, converting sports from wholesome athletic entertainment into a vehicle for gambling ....
[S]ports gambling raises people's suspicions about pointshaving and game-fixing. 1
The socio-economic costs of organized gambling include, but are
not limited to, new gambling addictions, bankruptcies, crime and
corruption. These costs outweigh any benefits of legalized gambling. Historically, the consequences of legalized betting on college and amateur sports were that it: "threatens the integrity of
sports, . . . puts student athletes in a vulnerable position ...
[serves] as gateway behavior for adolescent gamblers, and [it can
* Due to the rapidly developing issues, it was necessary to utilize current
periodicals. The editors attempted to delete the publications that were overly
influenced by the gambling industry. Steve Forsythe provided valuable assistance
editing and cite-checking this analysis.
** Professor, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana; B.A., William &
Mary; J.D., MBA, University of Georgia; LL.M., SJD, University of Virginia.
***McDermott, Will & Emery; B.S., J.D., University of Illinois at ChampaignUrbana.
1. NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, at 3-8 to 3-9
(1999) [hereinafter NGISC FINAL REPORT] (Statement of U.S. Sen. Bill Bradley).
Senator Bradley's statement was submitted with the testimony of Nancy Price to
the National Gambling Impact Study Commission in Las Vegas, Nev., Nov. 10,

1998.
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devastate] individuals and careers." 2 Furthermore, the American
Academy of Pediatrics estimated that the "first gambling" experience for over one million pathological teenage gamblers involved
sports. 3 Much of the American public during the 1990s was unaware that sports gambling was still illegal because point spreads of
games were published in the media. 4 Additionally, United States
Senators Sam Brownback and Patrick Leahy noted that "[t]here
have been more point-shaving scandals on our colleges and universities in the 1990s than in every other decade before it combined,
...[and these] scandals are a direct result of an increase in legal
5
gambling on college sports."
At the end of the Twentieth Century, sports gambling was illegal in every state except Nevada, where wagers could be placed
through casino sports books, and Oregon, where wagers could be
made through a state lottery game based on the National Football
League. The state of the law on gambling in college and amateur
sports sent a mixed signal to the public because only one state, Nevada, permitted such gambling, while the other states did not. As a
result, governmental decision-makers recognized that gambling on
college and amateur sporting events should be made illegal in all
states, rather than being legal in only one state. This present analysis utilizes the meta-language model of the McDougal/Lasswell
methodology of policy-oriented jurisprudence and confirms this
conclusion.

6

2. Id. at 3-10.
3. "Dear Colleague" Letter from United States Senators Sam Brownback and
Patrick Leahy, to members of the United States Senate (Jan. 18, 2000) [hereinafter
Letter of Senators Brownback & Leahy]; see also Gamblingon College Sports, Before the
U.S. Senate Com. Comm., 106th Cong. 5 (2000) (testimony of Dr. Charles T. Wethington Jr., President of University of Kentucky and Chair of National Collegiate
Athletic Association Executive Committee) [hereinafter Wethington Testimony].
4. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-10.
5. Letter of Senators Brownback & Leahy, supra note 3.
6. This particular analysis is summary in scope, but it was conceived within the
penumbra of the McDougal/Lasswell model for decision-making. In the areas of
legal and government policy, which subsume strategic socio-economic and business concerns, the classic decision-making models were formulated by the post
legal realists, in particular, Professor Myres McDougal and Professor Harold Lasswell who postulated a conceptual framework for legal decision-making in a
landmark article directed toward legal educators and law professors. See Harold D.
Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy ProfessionalTraining
in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 204 (1943); see alsoJohn W. Kindt, An Analysis of
Legal Education and Business Education Within The Context Of A JD./MBA Programme,
31J. LEGAL EDUC. 512, 517-18 (1981);John W. Kindt, An Analysis Of LegalEducation
and Business Education Within The Context Of A J.D./MBA Programme,13 L. TEACHER
12, 14-16 (1979); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Criteriafor a Theoy
about Law, 44 S. CALIF. L. REv. 362 (1971); Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a
FreeSociety, 1 GA. L. REv. 1 (1966). The decision-making concepts which McDougal
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II.

DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS

A. The ABCs of Legalized Gambling: Addictions, Bankruptcies,
Crime and Corruption
A poll conducted in 1974 reported that 61% of the American
population participated in gambling, while a Gallup poll conducted
in 1989 reported that the figure had grown to 81% and that 31% of
adults gambled weekly. 7 Henry Lesieur, one of the leading American gambling researchers, while chair of the criminal justice department at Illinois State University, stated, "I'm sure that [the
percentage of the U.S. population that gambles] ...is at least 85%
[as of 1995]; gambling is growing at a phenomenal rate in the
United States." 8 In further testifying to the growth of gambling,
William Jahoda, a participant in the witness protection program,
"who for nearly 10 years ran a $20 million a year illegal sports-betting operation for Chicago mob don Ernest Rocco Infelice," stated,
"It's about time. What's taken you so long? ... You see gambling
on every campus. It is an epidemic. It really has been out of
control."9
In 1997, the socio-economic costs of gambling were at least $80
billion per year with 4.4 million pathological gamblers and eleven
million problem gamblers. 10 These socio-economic costs, or "the
ABCs of gambling," far outweighed the benefits of legalized gamand Lasswell introduced were later expanded to include international law and domestic law, as these areas interfaced with "policy-oriented jurisprudence." See
Myres S. McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content and
Procedurefor ClarifyingGeneral Community Policies, 14 VA.J. INT'L L. 387 (1974);John
N. Moore, Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudenceof Myres McDougal and HaroldLasswell 54
VA. L. REV.662 (1968).
7. See Tim Layden, Bettor Education, SPORTS ILLUS., Apr. 3, 1995, at 69, 71. See
generally Ante Z. Udovicic, Special Report: Sports and Gambling a Good Mix? I Wouldn't
Bet on It, 8 MARQ.SPORTS L.J., 401 (1998).

8. See Layden, supra note 7, at 71 (quoting Henry Lesieur).
9. See id. at 70 (noting remarks by William Jehada)
10. See HowARD SHAFFER, MATTHEW N. HALL, &JONI VANDER BILT,

ESTIMATING

THE PREVALENCE OF DISORDERED GAMBLING BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND

43 (1997) (calculating, in tables thirteen and fifty-one,
.5% of the U.S. population or 1.5 million new pathological (addicted) gamblers
created by legalized gambling between 1994 and 1997); see also Press Release,
Harvard Medical School, Harvard Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence of
Gambling Disorders in North America (Dec. 4, 1997) (noting that from 0.84%,
"the prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population."). See generally Professor John W. Kindt, U.S. and
International Concerns over the Socio-Economic Costs of Legalized Gambling:
Greater than the Illegal Drug Problem?, Statement to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission (May 21, 1998).
CANADA: A META-ANALYSIS
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bling. 11 "The ABCs of gambling" were delimited as the costs of
gambling addictions, bankruptcies, crime and corruption.1 2
In 1995, Associate Professor HowardJ. Shaffer of the Harvard
Division on Addictions reported that "[g] ambling is an addictive behavior, make no mistake about it."13 Critics of casinos also argued
that casinos were tempted to market to pathological gamblers and
problem gamblers, who accounted for 27% to 55% of casino revenues. 14 Furthermore, the annual "bankruptcy costs" due to legalized gambling for new pathological gamblers were reported to be at
least $3 billion accompanied by 105,000 new bankruptcy filings per
year. 15 Similarly, the annual bankruptcy costs for new problem
gamblers were at least $1 billion with 30,000 new bankruptcy filings
per year. 16 The annual crime costs due to legalized gambling for
new pathological gamblers were conservatively estimated at $11.4
17
billion per year.
The costs associated with legalized gambling can be likened to
the costs associated with America's drug abuse problem. "The
ABCs of legalized gambling" cost an estimated $80 billion per year
compared to the cost of drug abuse, which totals $70 billion per
year.1 8 Both legalized gambling and drug abuse share the costs of
addictions, crime and corruption; legalized gambling, however,
adds the cost of bankruptcies. 19 Gambling addicts can lose everything in a matter of one night.20 This problem increased with the
rising popularity of Internet gambling, which maximized the "acceptability" and "accessibility" of gambling. 21 The legalization of
11. See Kindt, supra note 10.
12. See id.
13. Ford Turner, Neurochemicals Blamed for Compulsive Gambling, 8 CoMPutSIVE
GAMBLING 1, 1 (cited in article in the UNION-NEWS (Springfield, Mass.), May 10,
1995, (emphasis added)).
14. See Professor Henry R. Lesieur, Measuring the Costs of Pathological Gambling, Address at National Conference on Gambling Behavior & National Council
on Problem Gambling (Sept. 3-5, 1996).
15. See SMR RESEARCH CORP., THE PERSONAL BANRuP'rcY CRISIS 123-24
(1997); see also Kindt, supra note 10.
16. See Kindt, supra note 10.
17. CompareFLORIDA

GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, CASINOS IN FLORIDA: AN ANALYSIS OF

72 (1994), with Kindt, supra note 10.
18. CompareFLORIDA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, CASINOS IN FLORIDA: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS, supra note 17, and Kindt, supra note 10, with
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

Medical MarijuanaReferenda in America: Hearing before the Subcomm. on House Crime
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (Oct. 1, 1997) (statement of General Barry R.
McCaffrey, Director, United States Office of National Drug Control Policy).
19. See Kindt, supra note 10.
20. See id.
21. See discussion infra Part V.H.
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gambling maximizes the acceptability of gambling. 22 Similarly, the
accessibility of gambling is maximized when gambling activities be23
come readily available to the public.

B.

National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report

In 1999, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission
("1999 U.S. Gambling Commission" or "NGISC"), with the bipartisan support of Congress, concluded its two-year study on the social
and economic implications of legalized gambling. 2425 In its study,
the Commission made a number of factual findings.
First, the Commission found that many Americans were una26
ware that the majority of sports wagering in America was illegal.
The Commission suggested the reason was that the "Las Vegas
'line,' or point spread, is published in most of the [forty-eight]
states where sports wagering is illegal." 2 7 Second, the Commission
found "sports wagering does not contribute to local economies or
produce manyjobs." 28 Sports wagering was different from casinos,
which created incentives, because typically a bettor would use a single sports book agent. 29 Third, the Commission found that sports
wagering had significant social costs. 30 Fourth, the Commission

concluded that "sports wagering is widespread on America's college
campuses ...

[and] students who gamble on sports can be at risk

for gambling problems later in life." 31 The Commission found that
"sports wagering can act as a gateway to other forms of gambling. '3 2
This evidence strongly suggested that sports gambling at the college
and amateur levels should be uniformly illegal.
Consequently, the Commission recommended a ban on all legalized gambling on college and amateur sports based on its con22. SeeJohn W. Kindt, U.S. National Security and the Strategic Economic Base: The
Business/EconomicImpacts of the Legalization of Gambling Activities, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J.
567, 581 (1995).
23. See id.
24. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at introduction (Letter from National Gambling Impact Study Commission to the President, Congress, Governors,
and Tribal Leaders (June 18, 1999)).
25. See id. at 3-10.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at introduction (Letter from National Gambling Impact Study Commission to the President, Congress, Governors,
and Tribal Leaders (June 18, 1999)).
30. See id. at 3-10.
31. See id.
32. See id.
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clusions. 3 3 Specifically, the Commission concluded that sports
gambling has the following social costs: "[1] [it] threatens the integrity of sports, [2] it puts student athletes in a vulnerable position,
[3] it can serve as gateway behavior for adolescent gamblers and [4]
34
it can devastate individuals and careers.
C.

University Studies

In 1991, Henry Lesieur conducted a study which examined the
extent of gambling by college students. 35 The study surveyed six
schools in five different states. 36 Lesieur found that twenty-three
percent of the students engaged in illegal gambling activities at
37
least once a week.
In 1999, the University of Michigan Department of Athletics
conducted a study of just "student athletes" to determine: "(1) the
types of gambling activities in which student athletes engage; and
(2) the extent to which student athletes participate in these gambling activities." 38 The University of Michigan received 758 surveys
from 3,000 surveys sent to Division I football players, Division I
men's basketball players and Division I women's basketball players.3 9 The surveys inquired into "(1) general gambling activities;
(2) sports related gambling with friends; (3) gambling with bookmakers and other organized gambling activities; and (4) demo40
graphic and other general information about the respondent."
The study confirmed that sports gambling by college student
athletes constituted a major problem. First, "[n]early seventy-two
percent of all student athletes . . . have gambled in some manner
while attending college."'4 1 Second, "over 45% of male [student]
'4 2
athletes reported gambling on sports since attending college.
Third, " [ o]ver 5% of male student athletes... [had] wagered on a
NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-18.
id. at 3-10.
Layden, supra note 7, at 71.
id.
id.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See
See
See
See
See

38.

MICHAEL

E.

CROSS

& ANN G.

VOLLANO, THE

ExTENT AND NATURE OF GAM-

5 (1999); see NGISC FINAL REPORT,
supranote 1, at 3-10; see also College Athletes Admit to Gambling: Survey Also FindsPoint

BLING AMONG COLLEGE STUDENT ATHLETES

Shaving, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jan. 12, 1999, at DI [hereinafter Athletes Admit to
Gambling].
39. See CROSS & VoLLANo, supra note 38, at 13; see also Athletes Admit to Gambling, supra note 38, at D1.
40. CROSS & VOLLANO, supra note 38, at 12.
41. See id. at 16.
42. See id. at 24.
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game in which they participated, provided inside information for
43
gambling purposes or fixed a game in which they participated."
The mean amount of money wagered on a single sports bet
through a bookmaker was $57.25. 4 4 Student athletes who gambled
on sports with bookmakers were wagering an average of $225 per
month. 45 Researchers Mike Cross and Ann Vollano believe that
these figures are understated because "[t]he nature of the topic
may have caused some individuals to not return the survey due to
46
perceived threats to their athletic eligibility."
The study also contained a number of recommendations to
solve the student athlete gambling problem. First, the study noted
the need for the further education of students, particularly athletes,
with regard to the dangers of gambling. 4 7 Second, the study recommended "further education of coaches and administrators about
the prevalence of gambling by student athletes." 48 Third, the study
called for "a high level of awareness and intolerance towards [stu'49
dent] gambling . . . including forfeiture of eligibility.
The results of the University of Michigan study were consistent
with a 1996 study conducted by the University of Cincinnati. 50 The
University of Cincinnati received 648 replies to surveys sent to 2,000
male Division I basketball and football players. 51 The study found
that 26% of male student athletes reported gambling on sporting
events, 4% of student athletes reported gambling on a game in
which they played and approximately 1% accepted money for playing poorly. 52 These university studies, although extremely limited

in number, were conclusive as to the risks and dangers posed by
pervasive student athlete gambling.
III.

A.

CLARIFICATION OF GOALs

Overall Goals in Organized Gambling Issues

The overall strategic governmental goals in gambling issues
should be to conform with the common-law principle of maximizing "the public health, safety, and welfare." In this context, the ma43. See id. at 25.
44. Id. at 22.
45. See CROSS & VOLLANO, supra note 38, at 22.

46. Athletes Admit to Gambling, supra note 38, at D1.
47. See CROSS & VOLLANO, supra note 38, at 27.
48. Id.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Athletes Admit to Gambling, supra note 38, at D5.
See id.
See id.
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jor goals for governmental authorities and decision-makers are as
follows:
a.
b.

c.
d.

minimize the social impacts of pathological (addicted)
gamblers;
improve the public's overall economic well-being
(particularly the poor, the elderly, and the disadvantaged), and encourage business/economic
development;
repress and punish criminal activities;
promote ethical governmental practices in decisionmaking;

foster a first-rate educational system and an educated
public; and
f. maximize societal quality of life.
e.

Governmental decision-makers committed to these goals often recognized, too late, that the legalizing of gambling activities was adverse to accomplishing these policy goals.
B.

Secondary Goals in Organized Gambling Issues

The secondary goals involved in gambling issues and of importance to governmental authorities are as follows:
taxes - minimize the taxes necessary to achieve societal-governmental goals;
b. jobs - create newjobs and economic wealth throughout the economy; and
c. economic development - foster net new regional
and/or strategic economic activity and not just a "ster3
ile transfer of wealth." 5
a.

Legalized sports gambling does not accomplish any of these goals.
In 1999, approximately $2.3 billion was wagered in Nevada sports
books.5 4 Casinos retained $99 million, or approximately 3.5% of
the total amount wagered on sports, compared to total casino revenues of $10.1 billion in 1999. 5 5 An oddsmaker at Las Vegas Sports
Consultants estimated that 40% of the betting was on college
53. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 425 (10th ed. 1976).
54. See Laurence Arnold, Colleges, Casinos Gear Up for CongressionalFight Over
Sports Betting, LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 13, 2000; Patrick Hruby, Will a Proposed Federal
Ban on College Sports Gambling Be Enough to Stymie Scandal?, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2000, at Al.
55. See Arnold, supra note 54.
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sports, amounting to $39.6 million. 56 The State of Nevada received
an average of 8% of the amounts lost in tax revenue. 57 College
sports wagering, therefore, generated only $7.92 million in tax revenue. Steve DuCharme, chairman of the Nevada Gaming Control
Board, admitted that the money kept by casinos on sports gambling
was "very small" compared to other forms of gambling.5 8 A 1999
Gallup survey reported that 57% of adults opposed legalized sports
betting as a way to raise state revenues. 59 The 1999 U.S. Gambling
Commission, which included Nevada commissioners, concluded
that gambling through sports books did "not contribute to local
economies or produce manyjobs. '' 60 If sports gambling were eliminated, it would not result in a serious threat to the Nevada
economy.
C.

Goals Recommended by the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission

The 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission made a number of recommendations related to sports gambling based on its two-year
study of the social and economic impacts of gambling in the United
States. 6 1 Most notably, the Commission recommended that "betting on college and amateur athletic events that is currently legal be
banned altogether." 62 The Commission also recommended a ban
on "aggressive gambling strategies, especially those that target people in impoverished neighborhoods or youth anywhere." 63 This
ban should also extend to published point-spreads in the media because these point-spreads contributed to the popularity of betting
on college sports. 64 The Commission's findings included the observation that "sports gambling is popular among adolescents and may
act as a gateway to other forms of gambling."65 Therefore, the
Commission recommended that educational institutions and gov56. See id.
57. See Ricardo Gazel, Gambling: Socioeconomic Impacts and Public Policy: The Economic Impacts of Casino Gambling at the State and Local Levels, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 66, 77 (1998).
58. See Wethington Testimony, supra note 3.
59. See Press Release, Gallup Poll, Gambling in America, Social Audit (June
17, 1999) (hereinafter Gallup Poll].
60. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-10.
61. See NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at

29-46 (June 1999) [hereinafter NGISC
62.
63.
64.
65.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].

Id. at 30.
Id.
See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-10.
NGISC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 61, at 31.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

9

230

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1

VILLANOVA SPORTS

&

ENT. LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. 8: p. 221

ernments "fund educational and prevention programs to help the
public recognize that almost all sports gambling is illegal and can
have serious consequences. "66
IV.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Strategic Historical Implications of
Organized Gambling Activities

Historically, government-sanctioned gambling activities have
resulted in socio-economic costs that outweighed the benefits. The
benefits of legalized gambling included: (1) mega-profits to licensed organized gambling owners, (2) tax revenues and (3) jobs
directed toward gambling locations. Gambling activities essentially
constituted a "sterile transfer of wealth" that not only replaced, but
also hindered genuine economic growth. 67 Nobel Prize winning
economist Paul Samuelson summarized:
[Gambling] involves simply sterile transfers of money or
goods between individuals, creating no new money or
goods. Although it creates no output, gambling does nevertheless absorb time and resources. When pursued beyond the limits of recreation, where the main purpose
after all is to "kill" time, gambling subtracts from national
income.68

While the introduction of gambling-oriented dollars into a local
economy may have a multiplier effect, by the 1990s there existed a
growing body of evidence that in most economic scenarios the gambling multiplier was less than the lost multiplier associated with lost
6
consumer dollars.

9

Accordingly, governments have experimented with legalized
gambling activities throughout history, which sometimes are referenced as "waves" of gambling. 70 As the public becomes re-educated
to the socio-economic negatives, however, governments have invari66. Id.
67. See Kindt, supra note 22, at 567, 581; see also SAMUELSON, supra note 53, at
425.
68. SAMUELSON, supra note 53, at 425.
69. See, e.g., Paul Teske & Bela Sur, Winners and Losers: Politics, Casino Gambling, and Development in Atlantic City, 10 POL'Y STUD. REV. 130 (1991) (discussing
problem with Atlantic City); see also Earl L. Grinols, Gambling as Economic Policy:
Enumerating Why Losses Exceed Gains, ILL. Bus. REv. 6, 12 (1995). See generally E.L.
Grinols & J.D. Omorov, Development or Dreamfield Delusions?: Assessing Casino Gambling's Costs and Benefits, 16J.L. & CoM. 49 (1996).
70. See generallyJohn W. Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 51 (1994).
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ably re-criminalized and suppressed gambling activities. With
shorter institutional memories, governmental organizations are apparently periodically misled into sanctioning various forms of gambling - often prompted by the lure of "painless" governmental
revenues without additional taxation. Within a period of years,
however, governmental authorities usually relearn the painful
socio-economic lessons already known by economic historians. To
paraphrase Georg Hegel, "those who forget the economic lessons
of history, are condemned to relive them."
B.

The History of Legalized Sports Gambling

The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992
("Sports Protection Act") was enacted to regulate sports gambling. 7 1 The Sports Protection Act prohibited a government entity
or a person from operating a wagering scheme based on competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participated.
Section 3702 of the Sports Protection Act provided:
It shall be unlawful for 1) a government entity to sponsor,
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or
compact, or 2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or
promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly
(through the use of geographical references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended
to participate, or on one or more performances of such
72
athletes in such games.
The Sports Protection Act sent conflicting messages to the public because it allowed betting on college sports in some localities,
but not in others. Prior to enactment of this federal statute in 1992,
states were responsible for regulating sports gambling, and the four
states, which had pre-existing statutes allowing sports gambling,
were exempted from the Sports Protection Act. Sports wagering,
therefore, was legal in these four states, but only Nevada and Oregon offered it. Nevada offered sports wagering through casino
sports books, while Oregon ran a state lottery game based on National Football League games. Delaware and Montana enacted stat71. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04

(2000).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2000).
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utes prior to 1992 that provided for sports wagering, but as the
Twenty-first Century began, neither state offered sports wagering.
On April 3, 2000, United States Senators John McCain, Sam
Brownback and Patrick Leahy introduced a Senate bill to remedy
these loopholes. The Senate bill was entitled "The High School
and College Gambling Prohibition Act."'73 This legislation prohibited all legalized gambling on high school, college, and amateur
sports including the Summer and Winter Olympics. 7 4 The bill also
was designed to close the loophole that allowed for wagering on
college sports in Nevada by outlawing such gambling in all states.
C.

The History of Illegal Sports Gambling Over the Internet
The Wire Act of 196175 ("Wire Act") was traditionally used to

regulate illegal sports gambling over the Internet. The Wire Act
prohibited gambling businesses from using wire communications to
transmit bets or wagers, as well as information that assisted in the
76
placing of bets or wagers across either state or national borders.
However, supporters of Internet gambling interests argued that the
Wire Act was inapplicable to prosecute individuals who used the
Internet to place illegal sports bets.
Some courts interpreted the Wire Act to require that the defendant: (1) be in the business of betting or wagering, and (2)
knowingly use a wire communications facility to transmit information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers. 77 The first requirement provided a loophole to bettors when in United States v.
Baborian,78 a court held that "Congress did not contemplate prohib,,79 Rather, "Congress initing the activities of mere bettors ....
mean
bookmaking, i.e., the
to
of
gambling
tended the business
taking and laying off of bets, and not mere betting."8 0 Furthermore, the Wire Act was arguably an ineffective tool for prosecuting
73. S. 2340, 106th Cong. (2000). On February 3, 2000, United States Representatives Lindsey Graham,James Greenwood and David McIntosh introduced the
House of Representatives companion bill. See H.R. 3575, 106th Cong. (2000). The
House bill was not voted upon by the end of the 2000 term. On March 21, 2001,
Representatives Graham, Greenwood and McIntosh reintroduced the bill in the
House. See H.R. 1110, 107th Cong. (2001). Senators McCain, Brownback and
Leahy also planned on reintroducing the bill in the Senate in early April 2001.
74. See S. 2340, 106th Cong. (2000).
75. 18 U.S.C. §1084 (1961).
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Florea, 541 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Alpirn, 307 F. Supp. 452 (D.N.Y. 1969).
78. 528 F. Supp. 324 (D.R.I. 1981).
79. Id. at 328-29.
80. Id. at 328.
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operators of Internet gambling sites. Since its inception in 1961,
only a few operators have been successfully prosecuted under the
Wire Act.8"
To address this problem, on March 23, 1999, United States
Senators Jon Kyl and Richard Bryan introduced the "Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999."8 2 The proposed bill made it unlawful for a person engaged in a gambling business to utilize the
Internet or any other interactive computer service as a means to
place, receive, or otherwise make a bet or wager, or to send, receive,
83
or invite information assisting in the placing of a bet or wager.
This bill covered those individuals engaged in the act of mere betting and attempted to close the loophole found in the Wire Act.
D.

Private Regulations

Throughout the latter half of the Twentieth Century, professional and amateur sports organizations established strict regulations concerning sports wagering. Major League Baseball, the
National Football League ("NFL") and the National Basketball Association maintained rules stating that any coach or athlete betting
on their own sport was grounds for dismissal. 84 Each professional
league also provided players with referral services for treatment of
problem and pathological gambling. In 1998, the Executive Vice
President of the NFL, commented, "[s] ports gambling breeds cor'8 5
ruption . . .and undermines the values [the] games represent.
He added that the NFL did "not want [its] games or ... players
used as gambling bait."8 6 Similarly, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA") also prohibited "university athletics department members, athletics conference office staff, and student athletes from engaging in wagering activities related to intercollegiate
'87
or professional sporting events.
81. See Mark Hayes, Leagues Hold the Line on Anti-Gambling Bill, USA TODAY,
July 20, 2000, at B2.
82. S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999).
83. See id.
84. See NGISC FiNAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-11; see also Hearing Before the
Senate Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism & Governmental Information, 105th Cong.
(1997) (testimony ofJeff Pash, Vice-President, NFL) (noting NFL's strict gambling
policies).
85. Steven Crist, All Bets Are Off SPORTS ILLUS., Jan. 26, 1998, at 82, 86.
86. Id.
87. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-11; see also NCAA MANUAL § 10.3
(2001) (stating same); Letter from Cedric Dempsey, Executive Director of the
NCAA, to Commissioner Leo McCarthy, NGISC (Oct. 16, 1997) (on file with the
NGISC).
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V.

TRENDS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS

A.

Betting on Sports by Teenagers

On average, the percentages of pathological and problem adolescent gamblers consistently doubled those of the adult population.8 8 The final report of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission
stated that sports gambling frequently served "as a gateway to other
forms of gambling."89 AJune 1999 Gallup Poll found that "betting
on college sports was twice as prevalent among teenagers (18%) as
adults (9%)."9o Calling gambling "the addiction of the 1990s," the
American Academy of Pediatrics estimated that there were more
than one million teenagers "addicted to gambling," whose first experience with gambling involved betting on sports. 9 1
The June 1999 Gallup Poll also conducted a "social audit" and
reported very disturbing results about teenage gambling. 92 The
Gallup Poll found that 52% of teenagers aged thirteen to seventeen
9
were in favor of legalized gambling, while 47% opposed it.
3 The
study found that "20% of teens say they gamble more than they
should, compared to just 11% of adults." 94 The most disturbing
statistic was that "29% of teen gamblers claim[ed] to have made

their first wagers when they were ten years old or younger . .

.95

Furthermore, 27% of teenage gamblers bet on professional events
while 18% bet on college games. 96 These findings indicate that the
problem of teenage gambling begins in high school and continues
through college.
B.

The Extent of Gambling on College Campuses

Professor Henry Lesieur, while chair of the criminal justice department at Illinois State University, reported that "roughly 5.5% of

American college students are pathological gamblers. '9 7 Bill Saum,
NCAA director of agent and gambling activities, stated that it is
"reasonable to assume there are student bookies on every campus
88. See Kindt, supra note 10 (discussing adolescent gambling rates); see also
Kindt, supra note 70, at 90-91, Table 3.
89. NGISC FINAL

REPORT,

supra note 1, at 3-10.

90. Letter of Senators Brownback and Leahy, supra note 3; see also Wethington
Testimony, supra note 3.
91. Id.
92. See Gallup Poll, supra note 59.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. (discussing survey results).
97. Tim Layden, You Bet Your Life, SPORTS ILLUS., Apr. 17, 1995, at 46, 54.
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in America - Divisions I, II, and III."98 Experts warn that college
students comprise the fastest growing segment of the gambling
population. 99
One suggested reason for the rise of gambling on college campuses is that the "latest batch of collegians have more disposable
income than their parents ever dreamed of."10 0 Most college students are terrible credit risks, but many have wealthy parents who
can bail out their children when gambling debts become a serious
problem. 10 1 Jason Loomis, who pleaded guilty to registering bets in
connection with the 1996 Boston College football scandal, claimed
that at Boston schools, where tuitions often began at $15,000 per
year, "it was very common [for students] to get a check directly
from mom or dad [to pay off their gambling debts.] 1 0° 2 Loomis
claimed that he knew of a situation where a gambling debt was paid
by the parents of "a [Boston College] kid that lost $32,400 in two
weeks . . . [and] his parents paid it."103
In 1997, the Atlanta Journal-Constitutionconducted a survey in
which approximately half of the 200 college football players surveyed "said that betting on games other than their own should be
permitted." 10 4 In 1996, the University of Cincinnati conducted a
study and found that 25% of the Division I basketball or football
players surveyed reported that they gambled on college sporting
events.1 0 5 The study also found that almost 4% of the student athletes gambled on games in which they were players. 10 6 From 1995
to 1998, the NCAA reported that there were twenty-two cases involving about fifty student athletes "who bet on the outcome of college
'10 7
and pro games.

98. Mike Fish, Gambling Big Mania on Campus, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 1,
1998, at D1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Layden, supra note 7, at 90.
102. See Fish, supra note 98 at D8; see also infra text accompanying notes 121-22
(discussing 1996 Boston College Football scandal).
103. Id.
104. Id. at D1.
105. See id. at D8 (discussing survey results); see also CRoss & VOLLANO, supra
note 38, at 5.
106. See id.
107. See Fish, supra note 98, at D8.
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C.

The Frequency of Gambling Incidents Involving
Student Athletes in the 1990s

The June 1999 Gallup Poll reported that "[t]wo-thirds of [the
teenagers and adults surveyed] believe [that] betting on sports
events leads to cheating or 'fixing' of games ...

."108 Tom French,

an FBI supervisory agent in New York, stated that no one should be
surprised that student athletes would succumb to the promise of

easy money. 0 9 French noted that everyone in the school, including
the coach, was making money - except for the student athlete.' 1 0
The student athlete, who was not going to be in a professional
draft, was especially vulnerable to fixing games in exchange for

money.1 11 Additionally, it became increasingly more difficult to fix
games using professional athletes because of their skyrocketing salaries, while it became much easier to fix games using college athletes.11 2 In 1998, a study of 1,000 Southeastern Conference
students reported that "athletes were almost twice as likely to be
problem gamblers than non-athletes."" 3 Student athletes who bet
or advised others to bet on the games in which they played could or
would ruin their schools' reputations, jeopardize individual students' eligibility and compromise the integrity of the collegiate
114
games.
A chronology of just some of the 1990s most well-publicized
gambling incidents involving student athletes highlighted the
1 15
problems.
1992:

The University of Maine suspended nineteen athletes from the football and basketball teams for

108. See Gallup Poll, supra note 59.
109. See Fish, supra note 98, at D8 (discussing enticement of fixing games).
110. See id. (noting coach's ability to gain revenue from sneaker contracts and

summer camps).
111. See id. (discussing vulnerability). French noted the love of easy money is
especially enticing to the non-draft athlete, who will be just another former college

athlete who may find a job but will not possess a degree at the end of his college
career. See id.
112. See id. (noting high salaries of professional athletes reduce incentive to

fix games).

113. Chris Jenkins, Caught in Gambling's Web, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 2000, at

Cl.
114. See Layden, supra note 97, at 48 (noting harmful effects of student athlete gambling).
115. See CRoss & VoLiANo, supra note 38, at 9 (detailing forty-five years of
student athlete gambling incidents); see also Hruby, supra note 54, at Al.
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participating in a gambling operation, which re11 6
portedly involved $10,000 per week.
Similarly, the University of Rhode Island and Bryant College also uncovered additional gambling
operations.117
Northwestern University suspended starting running back Dennis Lundy for gambling. Lundy
later admitted to a federal court that "he intentionally fumbled the ball on the goal line in a
game against Iowa in order to win a $400 bet
against his own team."'118 At Arizona State University, fifteen of the school's twenty-two fraternities
appeared on betting records after four students
were busted in a ring gambling $120,000 a
month.119
The University of Maryland suspended football
and basketball players for betting on college
120
sports.
Boston College suspended thirteen football players for gambling on college football games and on
professional football and baseball games.' 2 ' Three
of the suspended players "were alleged to have bet
against their team."'122 Holy Cross also suspended
a football player and a basketball player for betting
123
on sports.
Arizona State University uncovered a point shaving
scandal in which "two former members of the basketball team admitted to shaving points on four
home games in the 1993-94 season."' 24 In a game
played against Washington State University, two
Arizona State students were also reported to have
gambled $250,000.125 During the same timeframe,

116. See CROSS & VOLLANO, supra note 38, at 9 (reporting gambling
authority).
117. See id. (reporting gambling authority).
118. Hruby, supra note 54, at Al.
119. See Layden, supra note 7, at 72-73; see also Hruby, supra note 54, at Al
(noting Lundy's purposeful fumble).
120. See CROSS & VOLtLANO, supra note 38, at 9 (reporting gambling activity).
121. See id. (discussing Boston College incident).
122. Id.
123. See id. (reporting gambling activity).
124. See id.
125. See CROSS & VOLLANO, supra note 38, at 9 (reporting gambling activity).
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1998:

Fresno State University initiated an investigation
into possible point shaving when after thirty games
the basketball team beat the point spread in only
126
eight games.
Two former basketball players from Northwestern
University "were indicted on charges of shaving
points, conspiring to fix games, and accepting bets
during the 1994-95 season."'127 Former football
players from the University of Colorado and Uni-

versity of Notre Dame were also allegedly involved
in the gambling ring as well. 128 In another instance, four football players from Northwestern
University, including Dennis Lundy, 129 "were indicted for perjury after [allegedly] lying to grand
juries that were investigating sports betting at the
1 30
school."
D.

The Infrequent Enforcement of Gambling Laws

Expert testimony before the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission
reported that illegal sports betting involved $80 billion to $380 billion annually, compared to the $2.4 billion legal sports betting in
Nevada.1 3 1 Government officials also complained that laws, which
make sports gambling illegal, were rarely enforced. Apparently,
law-enforcement agencies were not inclined to make arrests in connection with gambling rings because the work was labor-intensive
and there was little chance that those defendants found guilty,
would receive heavy penalties. 132 For example, Rod Platt, a police
officer on the University of Georgia ("UGA") campus, could not
recall even one gambling arrest in his seven-year career.1 3 3 Similarly, Sergeant T.O. Cochrane, the head of the drug/vice unit for
UGA's host Athens-Clarke County Police, claimed that his unit has
never pursued a gambling investigation.1 3 4 Sergeant Cochrane spe126.
127.
128.
129.

See id. (noting reasons for investing action).
Id.
See id. (noting expanded attraction from Northwestern incident).
See Hruby, supra note 54 at Al (noting Lundy's involvement in gambling

activity).
130. Id.
131. See Athletes Admit to Gambling, supra note 38, at D1.
132. See generally Layden, supra note 7, at 73.
133. See Fish, supra note 98, at D8 (noting lack of law enforcement attention
to campus gambling).
134. See id.
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cifically stated, "[w]e are certain that we have a degree of sports
gambling going on ....

Unfortunately, most if not all of our re-

1 35
sources and manpower [are] directed toward the illegal drugs."'
Obviously, the enforcement of laws prohibiting sports gambling
needed to be enhanced in order to stem the rising tide of pathological and problem gamblers.

E.

The Consequences of Publishing Point Spreads in the Media

By the 1990s, betting lines were widely disseminated in the U.S.
media for most college football and basketball games. According to
the final report of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission, one reason
that many Americans were unaware that sports gambling is illegal is
that the point spread "is published in most of the forty-eight states
where sports gambling is illegal."'1 6 As the Twenty-first Century began, the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Sporting News

were among the very few U.S. newspapers that did not publish the
betting line on college games.' 37 The FBI reported that in 1997
approximately $2.5 billion was wagered illegally on the men's
NCAA basketball tournament. 138 Also in 1997, the U.S. media began publishing the betting lines for the women's NCAA basketball
tournament. 13 9 Critics of the published point-spread claimed that
it did "not contribute to the popularity of sports, only to the popularity of sports wagering."' 40 Cedric Dempsey, President of the
NCAA, stated that publishing betting lines "in newspapers across
the country based on the gambling activity of the only state where it
is currently allowed, send[s] a mixed message to students and the
public at large about its legality." 14 1 Rick Pitino, the former Univer-

sity of Kentucky basketball coach, summarized, "I was always
135. Id.
136. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 3-10; see also Hruby, supra note 54
at Al.
137. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Throwing The Game; Why Congress
Isn't Closing a Loophole That Fosters Gambling on College Sports - and Corrupts Them,
TIME, Sept. 25, 2000, at 52, 57 (noting newspapers refusal to publish collegiate
betting lines). But see Letter from Dean Smith, University of North Carolina Men's
Basketball Coach, to Senators Sam Brownback and Patrick Leahy (March 29,
2000), available at 2000 WL 11070300 (noting point-spreads increasing presence in
legitimate newspapers) [hereinafter Coach Smith Letter].
138. See Fish, supra note 98, at D8.
139. See id. (noting gambling temptations are everywhere).
140. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-10.
141. Letter from Cedric W. Dempsey, President of NCAA, to members of the
United States Senate (Feb. 7, 2000) [hereinafter NCAA Letter to U.S. Senate].
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amazed at the people who stayed until the end of a game. Some42
body finally told me why: the point spread."'
F.

The Link Between Sports Betting and Organized Crime

On July 31, 2000, the University of Illinois conducted a conference sponsored by Deans William Riley and Mary Ellen
O'Shaughnessey, entitled, "Gambling Your Future Away: Gambling
on College Campuses," which along with a similar 1999 conference
at Northern Illinois University was one of the first academic conferences designed to address and remedy the problems of campus
gambling. 143 The featured speakers from law enforcement included IRS Special Agent Thomas Moriarty, FBI Special Agent Randal Sealby, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark Vogel. 14 4 Moriarty
emphasized the direct "link between sports betting and organized
crime... [and indicated that] innocent bets in good fun turn into
addictions that end up costing people their houses, their children's
education funds and their daughters' wedding money.' 1

45

Chicago

Crime Commission President, Thomas Kirkpatrick, pointedly summarized that "sports betting is organized crime's biggest single revenue source. And college students . . . are 'easy targets.' ",146
As highlighted in one example from 1998, "Michael Franzese,
a former captain in the Colombo organized-crime family, was part
of a plan with sports agents to sign up football players before their
college eligibility had expired. ' 147 Franzese claimed that organized

crime tries to establish compromising relationships with unsuspecting players by pushing them to incur more than they could handle
in gambling debts until "they had fallen in his trap," while William
Jahoda, the former head of one of Chicago's organized-crime gambling rings, detailed how games were "fixed." 148 Lex Varria, who

ran a campus bookmaking ring for a New England crime family,
stated that campus bookmakers would accept bets from students
"and would call in those bets to the mob-operated bookies. ' 149
Thus, by 1998 there were several former significant figures not only
142.
143.
GAzEytr,
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
74.
149.

Layden, supra note 7, at 82.
See Philip Bloomer, Experts Detail Problems From Sports Betting, THE NEWS(Champaign, Ill.), Apr. 4, 2000, at B1.
See id. (noting pool members).
Id.
Id.
Mike Fish, Playing For the Mob, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Feb. 1, 1998, at D9.
Id.; see also Tim Layden, Book Smart, SPORTS ILLus., Apr. 10, 1995, at 68,
Fish, supra note 147, at D9.
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from different organized crime families, but also from different sections of the United States, who were publicly detailing the direct
link between organized crime and sports gambling.
G.

Nevada's Former Prohibitions Against Gambling on
Nevada's Own Teams

Prior to January 25, 2001, the Nevada gaming regulations prohibited gambling on any collegiate Nevada sports team, whether
playing at home or on the road. 150 This protection did not extend
to the other forty-nine states whose college sports teams would be
the subject of legal wagers in Nevada. Nevada prohibited gambling
on sports teams within its own state to protect its own institutions
and student athletes. However, in an ethical oxymoron in 2001,
Nevada Governor, Kenny Guinn, sought to eliminate the betting
ban on Nevada's college teams in order to quiet critics and stop
15 1
Congress from outlawing college sports gambling in Nevada.
On January 25, 2001, the Nevada State Gambling Commission
eliminated the decades-old ban, which prohibited gambling on any
collegiate Nevada sports team in the State of Nevada. 15 2 Bill Saum,
the director of the NCAA's Agent and Gambling Activities Office,
was extremely concerned. "They've expanded college sports wagering," Saum complained, "[they actually went the opposite direction we were hoping for." 153 Nevada's "[g]aming commissioners

left little doubt that they had in mind a national effort by the NCAA
and lawmakers . . . to stop gambling on college and amateur
sports."1 54 The Nevada law did prohibit college athletes and

coaches from betting on their own games, and "require[d] sports
books to take reasonable measures to prevent such betting." 5 5 The
law, however, did not define "reasonable measures."1 56 In addition,
the new rules prohibited Nevada betting on high school and
Olympic sports.

15 7

150. See Nevada Gaming Reg. § 22.120 (2000) (stating prohibited wagers).
151. See Nevada May Lift State Betting Ban, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 29,
2000, at C9 (discussing debate over ban).
152. See Debbie Becker, Nevada Expands College Sports Betting, USA TODAY, Jan.
26, 2001, at Cl; see alsoJeff Simpson, PanelEnds Bet Ban on State Schools' Games, LAS
VEGAS REv.-J., Jan. 26, 2001, at Al (explaining rule changes).
153. Becker, supra note 152, at Cl.
154. Id.
155. Simpson, supra note 152, at Al.
156. See id.
157. See id.
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The Nevada gambling industry evidenced a pronounced hostility towards the NCAA's attempts to protect all institutions and student athletes. On February 11, 2000, the NCAA wrote a letter to
Steve DuCharme, then Chair of the Nevada Gaming Control Board,
requesting the removal of any university's name, when requested by
that university, from the betting boards at Nevada's sports books. 158
The Gaming Control Board denied the NCAA's request and
DuCharme equivocated that "other institutions are [already] afforded the same protections as Nevada's institutions because their
1'
home states don't allow betting on their own home teams.

59

DuCharme's reply failed to recognize that every other state, except
Nevada, made it illegal to bet on college sports in general. Prior to
2001, Nevada prohibited betting on its own college teams in order
to protect its institutions against game fixing. All institutions need
to be protected via a nationwide ban on college and amateur sports
gambling.
H.

Internet Sports Gambling

In 2000, estimates indicated that there were almost 700 websites accepting sports betting or offering casino-style games, compared to approximately thirty websites in 1997.160 Sebastian
Sinclair, a gambling industry analyst since 1994, reported that in
1999 revenues to Internet gambling sites were an estimated $1.2
billion - doubling from the $651 million in revenues during
1998.161 Basic socio-economic principles recognized that Internet
gambling produces very few economic benefits, yet creates tremendous social costs by maximizing the "availability" and "accessibility"
of gambling. Associate Professor HowardJ. Schaffer, director of addiction studies at Harvard Medical School, summarized: "As smoking crack cocaine changed the cocaine experience, I think
162
electronics is going to change the way gambling is experienced."'
Arguably, the Wire Act did not apply to foreigners outside the
United States, who operated nearly 700 websites accepting sports
betting. Some courts have also ruled that the Wire Act does not
cover the activity of placing a wager over the Internet. The problem was that the Wire Act was drafted many years before the preva158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Wethington Testimony, supra note 3.
Id.
SeeJenkins, supra note 113, at C1.
See id.; NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-15 to 2-16.
NGISC FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 5-5; see also Crist, supra note 85, at
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lence of the Internet. Thus, sponsors of the Internet Gambling
Prohibition Act asserted that it provided a better deterrent toward
placing bets over the Internet. In addition, shutting down gambling websites could be very time consuming and expensive. Congressional proposals, such as the Internet Gambling Prohibition
Act, were designed to require United States law enforcement agencies to locate websites offering Internet gambling, seek court orders
enjoining these gambling activities, and then "force Internet service
1 63
providers to shut down access to each one."
U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno warned that "[t]he Internet
is not an electronic sanctuary for illegal betting ..... To Internet
betting operators everywhere, we have a simple message: You can't
hide on-line, and you can't hide offshore." 164 A few states, such as
Missouri and Minnesota, have invoked consumer-protection statutes against Internet betting operators, but those cases only involved American based operations. 165 As a result, an increasing
number of American speculators began locating offshore to set up
foreign Internet gambling websites. In 1999, American Wagering,
Inc. of Las Vegas became the first established Nevada company to
1 66
accept Internet sports betting "on the Internet in Australia."
American Wagering, Inc. established an office in Canberra, Australia to accept wagers by phone and over the Internet.1 6 7 Due to protests and concerns about legality, the company divested "itself of its
'168
Australia-based Internet gambling site.
By comparison, Steve Schillinger, co-owner of World Sports Exchange, an Internet gambling website located in Antigua, "was one
of 22 offshore gambling operators charged" with violating the Wire
Act. 169 In 1999, World Sports Exchange "accepted $200 million in
sports wagers, ninety-five percent of which came from [American]
bettors .... "170 A Las Vegas lawyer, and advisor to the gaming
industry argued, that people "who are operating outside the
163. Doug Bedell, Web Has Tangled Laws Written for Earlier, Less-Connected
World, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 1999, § 4, at 5.
164. Id.
165. See Crist, supra note 85, at 86. In May 1997, the State of Missouri obtained a civil injunction combined with a judgment for $66,000 against Interactive
Gaming & Communications Co., a Pennsylvania subsidiary of Grenada-based
Global Casino, for accepting bets from citizens of Missouri. See id.
166. LV Firm Enters ControversialBusiness, LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 12, 1999.
167. See id.
168. Dave Berns, Wagering Online: Playboy Gambles, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Feb. 16,
2001, at D3.
169. Aixa M. Pascual, Offshore Betting: The Feds Are Rolling Snake Eyes, Bus. WK.,
Aug. 28, 2000, at 71.
170. Id.; see also Crist, supra note 85, at 90.
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[United States] and who have no intention of returning are basically immune from prosecution."1 71 In defiance of U.S. concerns,
the Antigua government continued to promote Internet gambling
by charging operators license fees of $100,000 per year for a virtual
172
casino and $75,000 per year for a sports betting site.
The Internet also poses many problems to the enforcement of
the United States anti-gambling laws. Arguably, it is time-consuming and expensive to shut down a gambling website, and as long as
foreign countries permit gambling websites, those websites would
perhaps be immune from the law of the United States, but not from
objections by influential United States trade organizations and federal agencies, including the State Department. Another alternative
is to attempt to block the websites from American consumers. However, operators of websites could apparently circumvent these attempts by changing the website's domain name. The most effective
method for prosecuting illegal gambling was to prosecute the bettors themselves. The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act provided a
starting point to effectuate this goal because it was broad enough to
outlaw the act of placing a wager over the Internet.
I.

The Freedom of Olympic Athletes to Bet on
Their Own Olympic Games

In 2000, the International Olympic Committee ("IOC") was
confronted with the need to establish anti-gambling rules for future
games. 17 3 Shocking some IOC members, it appeared that athletes
were "free to bet on themselves or their opponents at the [2000]
Sydney Games. ' 174 New South Wales, where Sydney is located, had
banned betting on the Olympics, but athletes could bet in the
Northern Territory and over the Internet. 175 Australian water polo
player Debbie Watson stated that "If I could get the right odds, I'd
put a fiver [wager] on the water polo team for sure." 17 6 Australia
expected at least forty-two million dollars in bets on the 2000 Syd177
ney Games.
171. Pascual, supra note 169, at 72.
172. See id.
173. See Rob Gloster, IOC, Dismayed at Prospect of Olympic Gambling, Vows Action,
THE CANADIAN PREss, Sept. 10, 2000.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Mike Hiestand, Taking a Gamble on Olympic Games IOC Opposes Legal Bets,
But Aussies Expect to Pull in $42M, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 2000, at Cl.
177. See id.
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Keba Mbaye, Chairman of the IOC Ethics Commission, announced that betting on the games was "in total contradiction of
the ethical principle of Olympism.' ' 17 However, in 2000, there was
no ban on gambling specified in the Olympic Charter.1 79 Even so,
Chair Mbaye claimed that the Ethics Commission of the IOC would
recommend amendments to the Charter to prohibit gambling on
the Olympics. s0 IOC members who opposed any ban on Olympic
betting claimed that a ban "could have [a negative] impact in na1
tions where gambling or lotteries are used to finance sports.''
This scenario prompted a movement in the U.S. by Congress
to outlaw gambling on the Olympics. Senator Patrick Leahy commented that "[tihe Olympic tradition honors sport at its purest
level. We, in turn, should honor that proud tradition by cherishing
the integrity of the Olympics and prohibiting gambling schemes on
the Summer or Winter Games." 18 2 The proposed High School and
College Sports Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000 was also designed
to eliminate betting on the Olympic games because the language of
the bill specifically prohibited gambling on the Summer or Winter
Olympics. 18 3
VI.

A.

POLICY

ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A Ban on College and Amateur Sports Gambling

Introduced in 2000, the High School and College Gambling
Prohibition Act was designed to prohibit all legalized gambling on
high school and college sports and the Summer and Winter Olympics. 184 Bipartisan Congressional leaders, pressing for implementation of the NGISC's recommendation for a ban on all legalized
gambling on college and amateur sports, sponsored the bill. 185 The
bill's drafters intended to close the loophole in the Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act, which allowed grandfathered
sports gambling in Nevada due to Nevada's pre-existing statute permitting college sports gambling.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Gloster, supra note 173.
See id.
See id.
Id.
146 CONG. REC. § 213, 215 (2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
See id.; see also H.R. 3575, 106th Cong. (2000); S. 2340, 106th Cong.

(2000).
184. See S. 2340; H.R. 3575.
185. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-18.
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A comprehensive ban on college sports wagering would have
certainly reduced the risk of scandals such as those that occurred
during the 1990s. 18

6

Individuals who placed extremely large bets

were reportedly the same individuals who were more disposed to try
to fix a game.' 8 7 These big-money bettors were unlikely to find
bookies who were willing to accept their bets because "small-time
88
and campus bookies seldom accept[ed] extremely large wagers."'
According to Bill Saum, head of the NCAA's Gambling Office, if an
individual wanted to bet one million dollars on a game then "[it]
would be virtually impossible to lay [the bet] down illegally....
You'd need many, many bookies in cities across the country. And
1
they talk to each other, so they'd probably stop taking your bets."

89

The 2000 bill received widespread support from many educational and sports institutions. The NCAA, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, the American Council of
Education ("ACE") and the United States Olympic Committee were
just a few of the many supporters of the bill. 190 Stanley 0.
Ikenberry, President of the ACE, stated, "[t] he proposed legislation
will go a long way to help maintain the integrity of athletic programs and help protect student-athletes who may be lured into inappropriate behavior due to promises of monetary gain."' 9 1
The bill faced tremendous opposition from casino lobbyists.
United States Representative Tim Roemer, who supported the companion legislation in the House, characterized the passing of the
bill as a "David versus Goliath battle."'1 2 American Gaming Association head, Frank Fahrenkopf, lobbied several members of Congress
to thwart the bill.' 9 3 In addition, casino mogul, Steve Wynn, made
a number of generous campaign contributions including $300,000
to the National Republican Senatorial Committee Chair Mitch McConnell and $250,000 to House Minority Leader Richard
Gephardt.19 4 Congress, however, was also sensitive to the concerns
186. See Hruby, supra note 54, at Al.
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Stanley 0. Ikenberry, American Council on Education President,
Statement on Proposed Federal Legislation to Ban Legal Collegiate Sports Gambling, Jan. 26, 2000, available at http://www.acenet.edu/news/press-release/2000/
Oljanuary/gambling-release.html [hereinafter ACE President Ikenbery Statement];
NCAA Letter to U.S. Senate, supra note 141.
191. ACE President Ikenbery Statement, supra note 190.
192. Mark Preston & Jim VandeHei, Gaming Battle Tips Off RouL CALL, Jan.
31, 2000, at 1, 22.
193. See id.
194. See id.;
see also Barlett & Steele, supra note 137, at 54, 60.
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of colleges and universities which involved numerous and important constituents. One problem was that the NCAA's lobbying
budget was only $200,000 per year, while the American Gaming Association spent at least $1.6 million in 1999 for lobbying purposes. 1 95 In addition, the gambling industry launched a public
relations campaign by distributing literature stating that "politicians
want to snatch away your rights! .

.

. They want to take away your

rights as an adult to come to Nevada and place a legal wager." 19 6
The bill also faced serious opposition from Nevada's Congressional delegation. Nevada Senator, Harry Reid, announced that he
would introduce an alternative bill to investigate illegal gambling
on college sports and on college campuses. 197 Senator Reid's approach, however, merely mimicked the results of the NGISC which
had already reported that gambling on college sports was a serious
problem. Simultaneously, Nevada Senator, Richard Bryan, claimed
that the NCAA-sponsored bill would "do absolutely nothing to accomplish the goal of eliminating illegal sports betting on college
'19 8
campuses and unfairly single[d] out Nevada to pay the price.
The elimination of illegal sports gambling appeared to be a secondary objective compared to the primary goal of criminalizing gambling on college sports. Becasue Nevada was the only state that
permitted gambling on college sports, by definition it was necessarily "singled out." Representative Jim Gibbons of Nevada also argued that the NCAA-sponsored "legislation targets the wrong
problem, neglects the hard facts, and fails to address the real problem - the pervasiveness of illegal sports betting on our college
campuses." 199 All of the proposals from the Nevada Congressional
delegation obviously sought to divert attention from the real problem - betting on college sports whether legal or illegal.
Senator Reid raised a valid point when he questioned: "why...
the existing regulations [are] not working and what can be done to
better enforce those laws which are already on the books?" 200 Even
so, legalized college sports gambling in Nevada broadcasted a
195. Barlett & Steele, supra note 137, at 60.
196. Id.
197. See Press Release, United States Senator Harry Reid, Reid To Introduce
Legislation To Investigate Illegal Gambling On College Sports (Feb. 1, 2000)
[hereinafter Reid Press Release].
198. Press Release, United States Senator Richard Bryan, Bill to Ban College
Sports in Nevada (Feb. 1, 2000).
199. Press Release, United States Representative Jim Gibbons, Gibbons Says
College Sports Wagering Ban Proposal Is Misguided (Feb. 1, 2000), available at
http://www.house.gov/gibbons/press00/pr.sportsbetsban.020100.html.
200. Reid Press Release, supra note 197.
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mixed signal to the public and led the public into believing that
college sports gambling was legal. The laws regulating sports betting needed to be amended to prohibit any gambling on college
and amateur athletic events. The High School and College Gambling Prohibition Act constituted the first step toward achieving this
goal by criminalizing all bets on college sports. Obviously, the strategic goal of eliminating sports gambling would not be achieved
merely by enacting a law. The law would need to be enforced properly to have a chilling effect on college sports gambling and to promote the values and integrity of the games.
On February 14, 2001, United States Representative Jim Gibbons of Nevada introduced a bill in the House of Representatives
20 1
which was drafted to curb illegal gambling on college sports.
The bill sought to establish a task force to study the effects of illegal
gambling on college sports. 20 2 The bill also penalized colleges and
universities by eliminating all federal funding, including Pell
grants, student loans and research money, if the institutions did not
comply with the requirements of the study 20 3 However, this bill
constituted an obvious and direct financial attack on U.S. higher
education - designed to intimidate educational interests into
dropping their support for eliminating Nevada sports gambling.
Educational institutions should not be penalized for failing to prevent illegal sports gambling because they could not possibly enforce
such an edict without the assistance of law enforcement officials.
The Nevada bill also ignored the fact that the 1999 U.S. Gambling
Commission had already studied the effects of legal gambling on
college sports and concluded that "betting on collegiate and amateur athletic events that [in 1999] is currently legal be banned
altogether."

B.

20 4

NCAA Response to College Sports Gambling

As of 2001, the NCAA rules prohibited all sports gambling by
campus athletics personnel, student athletes, and NCAA employees.
NCAA Bylaw section 10.3 provides that student athletes are ineligible to compete if they knowingly: (1) "[p]rovide information to individuals involved in organized gambling activities .

.

.;"

(2)

"[s] olicit a bet on any intercollegiate team;" (3) "[a] ccept a bet on
201. See H.R. 641, 107th Cong. § 1 (2001). On February 14, 2001, newlyelected SenatorJohn Ensign of Nevada introduced the Senate companion bill. See
S. 338, 107th Cong. (2001).
202. See H.R. 641; S. 338.
203. See H.R. 641; S. 338.
204. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-18.
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any team representing the institution;" (4) "[s] olicit or accept a bet
on any intercollegiate competition for any item ...

that has tangi-

ble value;" or (5) "[p]articipate in any gambling activity that involves intercollegiate athletics . . . through a bookmaker, a parlay
20 5
card or any other method employed by organized gambling."
These same rules apply equally to coaches, athletic directors, and

NCAA staff.206 In order to better enforce these rules, the NCAA

funds a full-time staff position, which focuses solely on agent and
207
gambling issues.
To educate the public, during the mid-1990s the NCAA began
broadcasting public service announcements about the problems associated with sports gambling especially during major network coverage of NCAA championship events. For example, in 1998 and
1999, the NCAA contracted with CBS and ESPN to run such public
service announcements during the broadcast of the Division I
men's basketball tournament. 20 8 The NCAA also sponsored various
workshops and distributed literature to educate students and the
public about the danger of sports gambling. 20 9 In addition, university coaches, such as Dean Smith, the former North Carolina men's
basketball coach, became active supporters of the effort to persuade
Congress to pass the High School and College Gambling Prohibi210
tion Act.

The NCAA, however, is limited in its authority to prevent gambling on college sports. The NCAA could not discipline the general
student population - only student-athletes. 2 11 Dirk Taitt, the
NCAA enforcement representative who handled gambling-related
infractions during the 1990s, commented, "It]he only hammer we
have is [athletic] eligibility." 2 12 Taitt also added that while the general student population was important, athletic eligibility did not
apply to them. 213 The NCAA is therefore powerless to regulate the
affairs of student non-athletes. Congress and law enforcement
need to work together to assist the NCAA in helping and educating
205. NCAA MArNUAL, supra note 87, at § 10.3.
206. See id.
207. See NGISC FiNAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-11.
208. See id.
209. See Wethington Testimony, supra note 3.
210. See generally Coach Smith Letter, supra note 137 (expressing agreement
with banning college and amateur sports betting).
211. See Layden, supra note 97, at 54.
212. Id.
213. See id.
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not just the student-

Responses From the Gambling Industry

During the late 1990s, the casino industry claimed that the focus should be on enforcing those laws that already made it illegal to
bet on college sports.2 1 4 Pro-casino enthusiasts claimed that the
NCAA was shifting the focus of university campus problems to the
legal sports betting industry. 215 However, the 1999 U.S. Gambling
Commission concluded that the social costs of sports gambling far
outweighed the benefits.

216

The heart of the problem was betting

on college sports, whether that gambling was legal or illegal.
The casino industry also claimed that banning legal wagering
on college sports would only lead to more illegal betting.2 17 This
was not necessarily a valid argument, because it would be very difficult to bet large amounts of money with a local bookie. 21 8 The local bookie probably would be unable to cover a large bet, nor cover
the payout on a game that was fixed. 219 Furthermore, there was no
evidence that recreational gamblers could become illegal gamblers. 220 In fact, there was "growing evidence from experts that for
every one dollar in new legalized gambling there is one dollar (or
more) in new illegal gambling." 22 '
The casino industry argued that a ban on college sports betting
would threaten the Nevada economy. 222 However, even the pro-

gambling Commissioners on the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission
unanimously concurred with the conclusion that sports wagering
did not "contribute to local economies or produce many jobs [or]
create other economic sectors." 223 In 1999, college sports wagering
2 24
only generated $7.92 million in tax revenue.
214.
215.
216.
wagering

See Preston & VandeHei, supra note 192.
See id.
See generally NGISC FINAL REPORT,supra note 1, at 3-10 (suggesting sports
threatens integrity of sports and does not contribute to local economics

or produce many jobs).
217. See Reid Press Release, supra note 197.
218. See Hruby, supra note 54, at Al.

219. See id.
220. See Kindt, supra note 10, at 17.

221. Id. (citing William G. Hall, Executive Director of Illinois Economic &
Fiscal Commission, Statement to Illinois Legislative Gambling Task Force (July 20,

1996)).
222. See Wethington Testimony, supra note 3.
223. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-10.
224. For a further discussion of goals of sports wagering, see supra Parts III,
III.B.
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Cynics argue that the government opposes Internet sports
gambling in order to protect its own franchise interests because the
government is unable to tax Internet site operators.2 2 5 Bethany Noble of the Internet Consumers Choice Group, a lobbying group in
Washington D.C., claimed that it was "really hypocritical when
states like Missouri, Minnesota and Wisconsin, which sanction gambling for their own profit, start taking a moral stand against people
betting with regulated businesses on the Internet. It seems like
their real interest is in protecting their pocketbook, not their
2 26
citizens."
Concerned by sports-gambling opponents such as Lou Holtz,
the University of South Carolina football coach, and Tubby Smith,
the University of Kentucky basketball coach, the gambling industry
responded to growing popular support for the High School and
College Gambling Prohibition Act in October 2000 by proposing a
$550 betting limit on sports books in Nevada.2 27 Some casinos at
this time regularly accepted bets of up to $15,000 on college football. 228 The Nevada proposal also prohibited sports books from ac-

cepting bets on college games from the coaches or players involved
in the event. 229 Bill Thompson, a gambling industry expert and
University of Nevada professor, suggested that the Nevada proposal
both restricts and expands betting on college sports because it allowed betting on Nevada collegiate sports teams "for the first time
23
in [fifty] years."

0

VII.

CONCLUSION

The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992
prohibited sports gambling in all states except for Nevada and Oregon. Gambling on college sports was legal only in Nevada, yet this
practice adversely affected the entire nation. According to the 1999
U.S. Gambling Commission, legalized betting on college and amateur sports "threatens the integrity of sports, it puts student athletes
in a vulnerable position, it can serve as gateway behavior for adoles23 1
cent gamblers, and it can devastate individuals and careers."
Studies demonstrated that sports-gambling is detrimental to the
225. See Crist, supra note 85, at 91.
226. Id.
227. See Cap on College Betting Proposed, CHARLESTON GAzETTE, (Charleston,
S.C.), Oct. 13, 2000, at C4.

228.
229.
230.
231.

See id.
See id.
Id.
NGISC

FINAL REPORT,

supra note 1, at 3-10.
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youth of the United States, and the Commission recommended that
betting on college and amateur athletic events be banned
altogether.
The High School and College Gambling Prohibition Act of
2000 was proposed by bipartisan Congressional leaders to
recriminalize betting on college sports in Nevada - the only state
where such activity was legal. Further legislation, however, is also
necessary to discourage sports gambling over the Internet. With
the rising popularity of Internet gambling, new addicted gamblers
could increase exponentially. It is necessary to close any perceived
loophole that permits Internet gamblers to escape prosecution particularly gambling websites. The United States government
needs to: (1) prohibit gambling in all states on the Olympics and

college and amateur sports, (2) do a better job of enforcing existing laws against illegal gambling, and (3) prohibit any gambling
activities on the Internet or in cyberspace.
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